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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries arising 
out of an automobile-truck accident. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After hearing plaintiffs' case for two days and 
allowing plaintiffs to make an additional proffer as 
to additional proof they wished to offer, the lower 
court directed a judgment in favor of the defendants 
and respondents, no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants and respondents seek affirmance of 
the judgment of the lower court. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellants' Statement of Facts is mcom-
plete and argumentative. 
This accident happened shortly after 4 :00 p.m. 
on a bright clear day. Immediately prior to the acci-
dent Max E. Green had delivered a load of concrete 
to a Phillips 66 Station located on the northwest cor-
ner of the intersection of Fourth North and Main 
Street in Brigham City, Utah. After completing the 
delivery he pulled the Red-E-Mix concrete truck out 
of the station and drove it to a position approximate-
ly 150 feet west of the west curb of Main Street and 
parked it at the north edge of Fourth North Street 
(R. 101). While Max Green, the truck driver, was 
standing on the platform washing out the mixer 
drum he heard the squealing of tires (R. 55). Mr. 
Green looked up and saw the Kim Mortensen vehicle 
sliding sideways about 50 feet away (R. 55). 
Defendants' Exhibit No. 8 shows the defend-
ants' truck and the platform on which Max Green 
was standing at the time of the accident. 
The record does not show that Fourth North 
Street narrows at the point of the accident. The evi-
dence only shows that there was an asphalt apron 
extending from the Phillips 66 Station to the edge of 
the asphalt on the roadway immediately south of the 
station and that thereafter to the west there was 
gravel and no apron. The area of the accident is 
clearly shown in defendants' Exhibits Nos. 5, 6 and 
7 received without objection. 
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The statement on page 4 of Appellants' Brief 
that there was a false impression created by the nar-
rowing of the roadway is argumentative as shown 
by the aforementioned exhibits. 
Kim Mortenson, the driver of the motor vehicle 
in which the plaintiff was riding was 15 years old 
on April 22, 1966 (R. 226). He stole the vehicle to 
get possession of it (R. 227). He had had no driver 
training instruction and no driver license ( R. 231). 
When he started to make the turn he accelerated rap-
idly ( R. 232). He lost control during the turn and 
went into slides and fishtails (R. 232, 233). First he 
slid the rear of the car to the north, then overcor-
rected to the south, then went back to the north. When 
he was out of control he did not apply his brakes (R. 
233). When he was sliding out of control at a speed 
of between 20 and 30 miles an hour he saw the truck 
30 feet away ( R. 234). He never saw any east bound 
traffic on Fourth North ( R. 234). He never saw the 
chute on the rear of the truck (R. 235). Kim Mor-
tenson admitted tha:t his automobile slid sideways a 
little bit before it hit the truck (R. 235). 
Defendants' Exhibit No. 9 shows the area of 
impact on the vehicle in which plaintiff was riding. 
Mr. Daines, trial counsel for the plaintiffs, stip-
ulated that from 150 feet west of the west curb of 
Main Street, Fourth North was zoned commercial 
and that the remainder of the block west was zoned 




MAX GREEN WAS NOT NEGLIGENT. 
At the trial appellants claimed Max Green was 
negligent in two respects: First, they claimed he vio-
latede §41-6-101 Utah Code Annotated 1953 in park-
ing a vehicle on a roadway. Second, they claimed he 
violated a Brigham City ordinance and a state stat-
ute, §41-6-128 Utah Code Annotated 1953, requiring 
anyone with a load extending from a vehicle more 
than 4 feet to have a warning flag. 
Max Green did not violate §41-6-101 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. This statute (quoted in Appellants' 
Brief on page 6) begins: 
"Upon any highway outside of a business 
or residence district no person shall stop, park, 
or leave * * *" (Emphasis added) 
The record, including the exhibits, shows there 
was a gas station just a few feet east of the accident 
on the north side of Fourth North and that there was 
a construction company office immediately north of 
the point of impact. 
This accident happened in Brigham City. It oc-
curred in a residential or commercial zone as shown 
by Mr. Daines' stipulation. A Philips 66 Service Sta-
tion and Whitaker Construction Company operated 
businesses on Fourth North. When counsel for the ap-
pellants refers to a vacant graveled lot used to park 
equipment on page 7 of his brief, he is admitting a 
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business use of property. It is an established fact that 
the property adjacent to the accident was being used 
to operate businesses. All reasonable persons consid-
der service stations and construction companies as 
businesses. 
In suggesting, as appellants' counsel does on 
page 7 in his brief, that Max Green was negligent in 
violating §41-6-101 Utah Code Annotated 1953, be-
cause he could have driven back to Parson's yard in 
ten minutes, he is talking about immaterial facts. 
How long it would have taken Max Green to drive 
back to Parson's yard is not competent evidence 
to show he violated §41-6-101 Utah Code Annotated 
1953. In substance, appellants' counsel is arguing 
that Max Green was negligent because he did not 
stay home. This is another form of the argument that 
you were negligent because you drove on State Street 
of Street. 
In deciding Hillyard vs. Utah By-Products Co., 
( 1953) 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287, this court did 
not mention §41-6-101 Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
Section 21-4-13 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, provides : 
"Sec. 21-4-13. Parking Not to Obstruct 
Traffic. No person shall park any vehicle 
upon a street in such a manner or under such 
conditions as to leave available less than ten 
feet of the width of the roadway for free move-
ment of vehicular traffic." 
In the Hillyard case, 27th South Street at 480 
5 
East had a surf ace of 24 feet and a 12 foot lane for 
traffic was provided in each direction. Utah By-
Products' driver parked a truck so that its rear end 
extended out onto the paved portion 5 feet. Vaughn 
Aston, the driver of the vehicle in which plaintiff's 
son was riding, could not see the protruding truck 
because of the vehicle ahead of him and crashed into 
the protruding vehicle occupying 5 feet of his lane. 
Under the Salt Lake County ordinance there is 
a duty not to park a vehicle upon any street in the 
county in such a manner as to leave available less 
than 10 feet of the roadway for free movement of 
traffic. Under §41-6-101 Utah Code Annotated you 
are not forbidden to stop, park or leave a vehicle on a 
highway within a business or residential district. 
In residential and business districts it is the cus-
tom and practice to park on the pavement at the side 
of the roadway. In these areas streets are of ten paved 
from curb to curb. A vehicle parked at the edge of the 
pavement in a business or residential area is one of 
those conditions all reasonable men are expected to 
anticipate. On the other hand, vehicles parked on the 
pavement outside of business or residential areas are 
not anticipated by reasonable men as it is not the cus-
tomary practice to park on the pavement outside of 
business or residential areas. 
With respect to appellant's contentions that 
Max Green violated §136 of the Brigham City ordin-
ance and §41-6-128 Utah Code Annotated 1953, ap-
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pellants' evidence failed to show a violation of either. 
Section 136 states no person shall drive any ve-
hicle with a load or object upon such vehicle extend-
ing 4 feet or more beyond the bed or body of said ve-
hicle during the daytime without having a red flag 
attached. The evidence in this case shows Max Green 
was not driving a cement truck but in fact was stand-
ing on it while it was parked at the edge of the road-
way washing out the mixing drum. Section 136 of 
the Brigham City ordinance does not require a warn-
ing flag on a load or object protruding 4 feet or more 
from a parked vehicle. 
Section 41-6-128 requires whenever the load up-
on a vehicle extends to the rear 4 feet or more, a red 
flag or cloth not less than 12 inches square be hung 
so that the entire area is visible to the driver of ave-
hicle approaching from the rear. 
Kim Mortenson ran into a large red and white 
ready-mix truck. He did not collide with a load on the 
truck. As the evidence shows the vehicle in which the 
plaintiff was riding collided with the rear of the ce-
ment truck and its chute and not with a load, this sec-
tion is inapplicable by its very language. 
POINT II. 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF KIM MORTENSON 
WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
THE ACCIDENT. 
The appellants argue the lower court should 
not have held as a matter of law the sole proxiimate 
cause of the appellant's injuries was the negligence 
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of Kim Mortenson, the 15 year old driver of the ve-
hicle in which David Anderson was riding. Accord-
ingly, for the purpose of discussion, let us assume 
that Max Green was negligent in parking the truck 
so that the right rear duals encroached on the pave-
ment and in failing to display a red warning flag and 
consider whether or not his negligence in either re-
spect was a proximate cause of the accident of which 
plaintiffs complain. 
In Hillyard vs. Utah By-Products, supra, this 
court set out guide lines to use in determining what 
the proximate cause of an accident was. In Hillyard 
the court said : 
"In applying the test of foreseeability to 
situations where a negligently created pre-
existing condition combines with a later act 
of negligence causing an injury, the courts 
have drawn a clear-cut distinction between two 
classes of cases. The first situation is where 
one has negligently created a dangerous con-
dition (such as parking the truck) and a later 
actor observed, or circumstances are such that 
he could not fail to observe, but negligently 
failed to avoid it. The second situation involves 
conduct of a later intervening actor who negli-
gently failed to observe the dangerous condi-
tion until it is too late to avoid it. In regard to 
the first situation it is held as a matter of law 
that the later intervening act does interrupt 
the natural sequence of events and cut off the 
legal effect of the negligence of the initial ac-
tor. This is based upon the reasoning that it 
is not reasonably to be foreseen nor expected 
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that one who actually becomes cognizant of a 
dangerous condition in ample time to avert in-
jury will fail to do so." 
The Hillyard case involved a fact situation 
which fitted into the second category above where 
the negligent second actor failed to observe the con-
dition until it was too late to avoid a collision. 
On the other hand, in the present case there is no 
allegation and the facts show that the cement truck 
was not hidden and that Kirn Mortenson could clearly 
have seen it before he turned from Main Street onto 
Fourth North to go west. This case fits in the first 
category of cases mentioned in Hillyard and the neg-
ligence of Kirn Mortenson was an intervening act 
which interrupted the natural sequence of events and 
cut off the legal effect of the negligence, if any, if 
Max Green. 
In McMurdie vs. Underwood, (1959) 9 Utah 2d 
400, 346 P.2d 711, this court said: 
"It does not seem unreasonable to con-
clude that one who approaches a dangerous 
condition, created by the negligence of another, 
and either sees it or circumstances are such 
that one must see it in time to avoid danger, 
and fails to do so, becomes the sole proximate 
cause of any damage or injury caused there-
by." 
Velasquez vs. Greyhound Lines, Inc., ( 1961) 12 
Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989, from a factual stand-
point, is the closest case in point. In this case a colli-
9 
sion occurred on Interstate 80 in southwestern Wyo-
ming. The hard surface of the westbound lanes in-
cluded two 12 foot traffic lanes, a 4 foot shoulder on 
the inside (south) and a 10 foot emergency pull out 
strip on the outside (north). James Buckley, travel-
ing west, pulled his car off the highway in the emer-
gency strip on the north side because of tire trouble 
and sought help from passing motorists. An Inter-
state Motor Lines truck stopped beside Buckley, par-
tially in the 10 foot emergency lane but with its back 
end protruding approximately 7 feet into the outside 
westbound lane. The truck driver left clearance lights 
on and the driver of the Greyhound Lines bus observ-
ed the truck three-fourths of a mile away and realiz-
ed it and the Buckley vehicle were stopped. The bus 
driver intended to stop behind the truck 'to render 
assistance even though there was plenty of room for 
him to have passed in the inside westbound lane. 
Thereafter, momentarily the bus driver lost consci-
ousness, either blacking out or falling asleep, and did 
not wake up until a woman passenger shouted a 
warning, ''Don't hit it." The bus driver swerved to 
his left but could not avoid a collision. Velasquez, the 
plaintiff, was a passenger in the Greyhound hus and 
the action was brought against Interstate Motor 
Lines, its driver and Greyhound Lines, Inc. and its 
driver. The lower court held that as a matter of law 
the negligence of the bus driver was the sole proxi-
mate cause of the collision. 
In the Velasquez case in affirming a judgment 
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n.o.v. in favor of the trucking company, the court 
said: 
"We quite agree with the proposition that 
where one has negligently created a condition 
of danger he is not relieved of responsibility 
for damage it causes to another merely because 
the injury also involved the later misconduct 
of someone else. But this is true only if both 
negligent acts are in fact concurring proxi-
mate causes of the injury; and it is not true 
if the later negligence is an independent, in-
tervening sole proximate cause of the inci-
dent." 
"In Hillyard vs. Utah By-Products Co., 
we had occasion to consider the problem of 
proximate cause in another case where defen-
dant's truck had been parked protruding onto 
the highway and was run into by a car in 
which the person injured was a guest passen-
ger. It was held that under the particular fact 
situation the prior negligent parking of the de-
fendant's truck could reasonably be found to 
be a concurring proximate cause of the colli-
sion. The deceased was a guest in a car being 
negligently driven; the driver veered to his left 
in attempting to pass a car ahead; saw a car 
coming from the other direction; then moved 
back into his own lane just as the car ahead 
swerved to its left to miss the parked truck, 
thus leaving the driver suddenly confronting 
the parked truck when it was too late to avoid 
it. We held that in this emergency situation 
the prior negligent parking of the truck set-
ting up the hazard could reasonably be found 
to be a concurring proximate cause with the 
negligence of the driver in producing the in-
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jury. But we also pointed out that even where 
there is a negligently created hazard (Inter-
state parking the truck) and a later actor 
(Greyhound) observed, or circumstances were 
such that he could not fail to observe, the con-
dition, but he nevertheless negligently failed 
to avoid it, the latter negligence would be an 
independent, intervening cause and therefore 
the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
"In determining whether the negligence 
in creating a hazard ( Interstate's parking the 
truck) was a proximate cause of the collision, 
this is the test to be applied; did the wrongful 
act, in a natural and continuous sequence of 
events which might reasonably be expected to 
follow, produce the injury. If so, it can be said 
to be a concurring proximate cause of the in-
jury even though the later negligent act of an-
other (Greyhound) cooperated to cause it. On 
the other hand, if the latter's act of negligence 
in causing the collision was of such character 
as not reasonably to be expected to happen in 
the natural sequence of events, then such later 
act of negligence is the independent, interven-
ing cause and therefore the sole proximate 
cause of the injury. 
"Applying the foregoing test 'to our situ-
ation: we think it is not reasonably to be fore-
seen that an oncoming driver (Greyhound) 
would see (or fail to see) this large, well-light-
ed truck so parked up on the highway, and 
with at least one and one-half useable traffic 
lanes to his left, nevertheless run into it. The 
trial court was correct in so concluding and 
entering a judgment in favor of Interstate 
Motor Lines as a matter of law on the ground 
that 'the negligence of Greyhound was the sole 
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proximate cause of the collision." (Emphasis 
added) 
This case is similar to the Velasquez case. If, for 
the sake of discussion we assume Max Green was neg-
ligent in parking the cement truck with the left rear 
duals partially on the roadway, nevertheless the trial 
court was justified in finding that the negligence of 
Kim Mortenson was the sole proximate cause of the 
collision. The truck, a large red and white ready-mix 
truck, was parked at least 150 feet west of the west 
curb of Main Street on Fourth North, a straight and 
level road. The accident occurred about 4 :15 p.m. in 
broad daylight. Fourth North Street was paved ap-
proximately 27 feet wide. There was no oncoming 
traffic and even if 2 feet of the truck were on the 
pavement, there was 25 feet of useable roadway to 
the left of the ready-mix truck. In the ordinary 
course of events it is not reasonable to believe that 
an oncoming driver would fail to see this large 
red and white ready-mix truck until he was within 
30 feet of it and that if the truck driver had had a red 
flag tied onto the chute, a collision could have been 
avoided. It is not reasonable to assume that Green 
should have foreseen that a 15 year old driver would 
come around the turn at high speed, out of control 
and fishtailing and that he would slide sideways into 
the rear of the truck. 
Kim Mortenson's negligent conduct constituted 
an independent, intervening cause and was, there-
fore, the sole proximate cause of the accident and in-
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juries resulting even if you assume negligence on the 
part of Max Green. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court should be af-
firmed because: 
1. The evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, in-
cluding the additional proffered evidence, failed to 
show as a matter of law Max Green was negligent. 
2. The evidence showed as a matter of law the 
sole proximate cause of the accident in question and 
resulting injuries was the negligence of Kim Mor-
tenson. 
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